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“OK GOOGLE” PLAY THE NATIONAL ANTHEM: ARMS
CONTROL AND EMINENT DOMAIN TO MAINTAIN
AMERICA’S TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE
Major Johnathan J. Rudy*

The country that first controls and dominates emerging technologies such as
artificial intelligence and quantum computing will have the power to re-shape the
world to their benefit. The US federal government has historically been the source
of breakthroughs in technology and science, but Silicon Valley now controls much
of the technology development needed for future defense and weapons systems.
Driven by profit, the private sector has been more open to dealing new technologies
to foreign adversaries while the US national security apparatus has a vested
interest in ensuring powerful new technologies remain unattainable to countries
that may wish harm to the United States. This paper recommends changes to export
laws to specifically address the quick pace of sensitive technological development
in the private sector, and it advocates for new statutory authority to seize
technology through eminent domain as a last resort.
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Arms Control and Eminent Domain to Maintain U.S. Technological Advantage
HAWLEY: So I just want to make sure that I understand exactly what
you’re saying. You’re telling me that Google, an American
company, supposedly, is refusing to work with the Department of
Defense, but is doing work with China, in China, in a way that at
least indirectly benefits the Chinese government. Is that correct?
SHANAHAN: I haven’t heard the word refuse, but there’s a lack of
willingness to support DOD programs.
HAWLEY: General you’re nodding your head; do you want to weigh
in on this?
DUNFORD: You know Senator I’m nodding my head on exactly the
point that you made that the work that Google is doing in China is
indirectly benefitting the Chinese military. And I’ve been very public
on this issue as well in fact the way I described it to our industry
partners is “look, we’re the good guys in the values that we
represent and the system that we represent is the one that will allow
and has allowed you to thrive” and that’s the way I’ve characterized
it. I was just nodding that what the Secretary was articulating is the
general sense of all of us as leaders. We watch with great concern
when industry partners work in China knowing there is that indirect
benefit, and frankly “indirect” may be not a full characterization of
the way it really is. It’s more of a direct benefit to the Chinese
military.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In living memory, the U.S. government has operated with a global
technological advantage. Our current advantage relies on access to advanced
technology developed by private industries—while simultaneously limiting our
adversaries’ access to that same technology.2 The government cannot take a laissez
faire approach and hope that the status quo will hold. Unless existing export control
regulations are strengthened, and a new eminent domain authority is enacted, the
1

Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense Budget Posture in Review of the
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Armed Services, 116th Cong. 83-84 (2019) (statement of General
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., United States Marine Corps 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
2
See David Shepardson, U.S. tightening restrictions on Huawei access to technology,
chips, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech/u-stightening-restrictions-on-huawei-access-to-technology-chips-idUSKCN25D1CC.
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United States risks losing its advantage and becoming beholden to Silicon Valley’s
whims.
The consequences of losing are clear: whoever controls emerging
technologies like artificial intelligence (“AI”) and quantum computers (“QC”) will
have the power to re-shape the world to their benefit. “Artificial intelligence is the
future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal
opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the
leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”3
The private sector is the new driver of innovation for technology with
national security implications. This is a major shift away from the historical model
of the federal government funding research that guided the cutting edge. 4 On
October 23, 2019, Mr. Michael Brown, director of the Department of Defense
(DoD) Defense Innovation Unit noted that:
[A] lack of U.S. government investment is part of the
problem. Sixty years ago, most of the country’s
technology innovation was supported by the military.
But the government’s investment has been on a
steady decline since the 1960s . . . . That leaves
technology for defense and weapons systems, and
humanitarian and disaster relief, to Silicon Valley.5
When the federal government played a greater role in technological
development, they also had greater control over how new technology was dispersed
and used. Now that the government is more of a customer than a creator, the tech
behemoths act as the gatekeepers.6 But, unlike the federal government, Silicon
Valley does not have the same incentive to limit access to emerging technology—

'Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day, RT (Sep.
1, 2017), https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.
4
Caleb Foote & Robert Atkinson, Federal Support for R&D Continues Its Ignominious
Slide, INFO. TECH. AND INNOVATION
FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://itif.org/publications/2019/08/12/federal-support-rd-continues-itsignominious-slide.
5
Heather Somerville, China Has ‘Concerning’ Leads Over U.S. in Tech, Defense Department
Official Says, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-hasconcerning-leads-over-u-s-in-tech-defense-department-official-says-11571856288.
6
See Scott Rosenburg, Tech giants are the new gatekeepers,
AXIOS (Feb. 1, 2019) https://www.axios.com/tech-giants-new-gatekeepers-154897697425f26494-a67c-4252-9c18-418588f8de06.html.
3

2

Arms Control and Eminent Domain to Maintain U.S. Technological Advantage
companies see new technology through the lens of profit, while the federal
government see through the lens of national security.
Recently, private U.S. companies have shown a willingness to do business
with foreign competitors and a reluctance to do business with their own
government. 7 In 2017, Google reentered the Chinese market after a seven-year
absence by opening an artificial intelligence development center. 8 At the same
time, Google chose not to renew a contract with the DoD.9 Once the DoD contract
with Google that was up for renewal became public, Google employees revolted.10
They sent a letter to Google’s CEO, Mr. Sundar Pichai, arguing “that Google should
not be in the business of war. Therefore we ask that Project Maven be canceled,
and that Google draft, publicize and enforce a clear policy stating that neither
Google nor its contractors will ever build warfare technology.” 11 Google
capitulated, and did not renew the Project Maven contract. 12 One of America’s
largest technology companies, the global leader of AI development, opened an AI
center in China but limited its AI business with the United States. 13 It is this
dichotomy that that must be reckoned with.
The paper begins by outlining the emerging technologies at issue, mainly
AI and QC (Part II). This paper then discusses the current state of export control
laws, and makes recommends that those laws need to be upgraded to keep pace
with technological development (Part III). This paper concludes by exploring the
concept of eminent domain, bounded by the Fifth Amendment, as applied to
emerging technology. This paper argues for new statutory authority to seize
Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work
for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html.
8
Carlos Tejada, Google, Looking to Tiptoe Back into China, Announces A.I. Center, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/business/google-ai-china.html.
9
Daisuke Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/googlepentagon-project-maven.html.
10
Id.
11
Google should not be in business of war, say employees, BBC (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43656378 (noting that Project Maven was a Department of
Defense (DoD) contract held by Google, in which the DoD used Google’s image recognition
artificial intelligence (AI) to search for targets of potential military significance in satellite
imagery).
12
Sundar Pichai, AI at Google: our principles, GOOGLE BLOG (June 7, 2018),
https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/.
13
Cheang Ming, Google is blocked in China, but that’s not stopping it from opening an A.I. center
there, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/13/alphabets-google-opens-chinaai-centre.html.
7
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technology using eminent domain as a last resort (Part IV). If the United Sates limits
our adversaries’ access to American made emerging technology, while
guaranteeing that the U.S. government will always have access to that technology,
as the age-old maxim says, we can have our cake and eat it too. First, let’s turn to
the technology.
II. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
In August 2018, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019, Congress enacted the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA).14
The ECRA authorizes the Department of Commerce to “establish appropriate
controls” on “emerging and foundational technologies” that are essential to the
“national security of the U.S.” 15 The ECRA does not define what constitutes
“emerging and foundational technologies,” the ECRA leaves that to an interagency
process.16 In December 2018, the Department of Commerce published an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking requesting comments on, “criteria for identifying
emerging technologies that are essential to U.S. national security.”17
For two years, the Department of Commerce took no action. On January 6,
2020, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued its first interim final rule
which “amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to make certain
items subject to the EAR and to impose a license requirement for the export and
reexport of those items to all destinations, except Canada.”18 Specifically, this rule
restricts export, without a license, for “[g]eospatial imagery ‘software’ ‘specially
designed’ for training a Deep Convolutional Neural Network to automate the
analysis of geospatial imagery and point clouds . . . .”19 The 2018 advance notice
of proposed rulemaking identified fourteen categories of interest. 20 The 2020
interim final rule is the first rule to come out of the advanced notice of proposed

14

50 U.S.C.A. § 4801 (2018).
50 U.S.C.A. § 4817(b) (2018).
16
50 U.S.C.A. § 4817(a) (2018).
17
DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., R. OF CONTROLS FOR CERTAIN EMERGING TECH.
(2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2018-0024-0001 (stating that merging
technologies are considered essential to U.S. national security “because they have potential
conventional weapons, intelligence collection, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorist
applications or could provide the United States with a qualitative military or intelligence
advantage . . . .”).
18
Addition of Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to the
Export Control Classification Number 0Y521 Series, 85 Fed. Reg. 459 (proposed Jan. 6, 2020)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 774).
19
Id. (discussing the technology underpinning Google’s Project Maven).
20
DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., supra note 17.
15
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rulemaking and only addresses one category.21 Two years, one problem addressed,
thirteen to go.
A.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The DoD defines AI as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that
normally require human intelligence—for example, recognizing patterns, learning
from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action—
whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems.”22
In the 1950s, when AI was first theorized, the goal was to “mimic human
cogn[ition]” by allowing a system to learn from its own experiences and make
decisions based on reasoning.23
Today, AI encompasses a broad swath of modern computing types, from
seemingly simple optical character recognition, to machine learning, and up to yetto-be-realized human-level AI.24 Both the United States and China have identified
AI development as a strategic main effort. The United States has recognized that
“[t]o maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will prioritize emerging
technologies critical to economic growth and security, such as data science,
encryption, . . . advanced computing technologies, and artificial intelligence.” 25
The White House has requested approximately $350 million in national securityrelated AI funding for fiscal year 2020, out of a total budget request for $973 million
in AI research and development funding spread across 28 agencies.26

Addition of Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to the
Export Control Classification Number 0Y521 Series, 85 Fed. Reg. 459 (proposed Jan. 6, 2020)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 774).
22
U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEP’T OF DEF. ARTIFICIAL INTEL. STRATEGY:
HARNESSING AI TO ADVANCE OUR SEC. AND PROSPERITY 5 (2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AISTRATEGY.PDF.
23
Ron Schmelzer, Is Machine Learning Really AI?, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/11/21/is-machine-learning-reallyai/#15d707f62621.
24
Id.
25
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 (2017), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1043812.pdf.
26
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. RESEARCH
AND DEV. PROGRAM SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S FY2020 BUDGET 10 (Sept. 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FY2020-NITRD-AI-RD-BudgetSeptember-2019.pdf.
21
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Like the United States, China is making direct strategic investments in
developing the next generation of technology, including AI. 27 In 2017, China
announced that by 2030, it plans to “become the world's major artificial intelligence
innovation center.” 28 China’s efforts will focus on research areas including big
data, cross-media perception computing, hybrid augmented intelligence, swarm
intelligence, autonomous collaborative control, brain-like intelligent computing,
and quantum intelligent computing.29 China has backed that plan with a $30-billion
venture capital fund.30
Unlike the United States, China goes beyond legitimate direct investment
in research and development and persistently engages in nation state-level
intellectual property theft to fuel its ambitious 2030 goal of leapfrogging the United
States. 31 “Chinese industrial policy seeks to ‘introduce, digest, absorb, and reinnovate’ technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world. This
policy is carried out through state-sponsored IP theft through physical theft, cyberenabled espionage and theft, evasion of U.S. export control laws, and counterfeiting
and piracy. . . .”32
Despite direct U.S. and Chinese government investment, and Chinese theft,
the private sector is driving AI innovation: “tech behemoths like Google, Microsoft,
IBM and Apple, [in] the United States is where the bulk of A.I. innovation has taken
place.” 33 Chinese companies like “Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, [are] moving
rapidly to close the gap.”34

Major Andrew S. Bowne, Innovation Acquisition Practices in the Age of AI, ARMY LAW., no. 1,
2019, 74, 76, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/01-2019.pdf.
28
St. Council on Issuing Notification of New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development
Planning, ST. COUNCIL (2017) (China), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201707/20/content_5211996.htm.
29
Id.
30
China Sets Up 30 Bln-dollar State Venture Capital Fund, CHINA.ORG.CN (Aug. 18,
2016), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2016-08/18/content_39120255.htm (China.org.cn is the
authorized government portal site to China and is under the auspices of the State Council
Information Office and the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) in Beijing).
31
See WHITE HOUSE, HOW CHINA’S ECON. AGGRESSION THREATENS THE TECH. AND INTEL. PROP.
OF THE U.S. AND THE WORLD (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf.
32
Id.
33
Vikram Barhat, China is Determined to Steal A.I. Crown From US and Nothing, Not Even a
Trade War, Will Stop it, CNBC (May 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/04/china-aims-tosteal-us-a-i-crown-and-not-even-trade-war-will-stop-it.html.
34
Id.
27
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The stakes are high. The DoD has acknowledged that “[f]ailure to adopt AI will
result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people. . . .”35 The United
States has a strategic interest in maintaining an AI advantage over countries like
China, but the United States cannot become myopic in its focus on AI. Both AI and
QC are synergetic, as “Google’s long-term strategy is to use quantum computers
for machine-learning applications.”36 Quantum computing is an equally disruptive
technology on the verge of real-world applications.
B.

QUANTUM COMPUTERS

Quantum computers are an alternative to existing classical computers.
Current desktop computers, smartphones, and supercomputers all work the same
way. They sequentially process individual bits of data coded as either a 1 or a 0 by
turning switches called transistors on or off.37
By contrast, quantum computers hurtle through calculations
instantaneously, with each quantum bit, or qubit, able to represent data as both zero
and one, permitting two simultaneous calculations. The more qubits, the greater
the computing power . . . . [A] 300-qubit system could in an instant ‘run more
calculations than there are atoms in the universe.’38
U.S. companies like Google, IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and Lockheed Martin
are all developing QC technology. 39 Foreign companies like Baidu, Hitachi,

U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPT. OF DEF. ARTIFICIAL INTEL. STRATEGY:
HARNESSING AI TO ADVANCE OUR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY 5 (2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AISTRATEGY.PDF.
36
Charles Q. Choi, Qubit Revolution, ASEE PRISM, Jan. 2017, at 22, 27.
37
Id. at 25. For a more detailed explanation of quantum computing and how it is revolutionizing
business, see Quantum Computing Is Coming, Bit by Quibit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/science/quantum-computer-physics-qubits.html.
38
Choi, supra note 36.
39
Quantum, GOOGLE RESEARCH, https://research.google/teams/applied-science/quantum/ (last
visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Starts Here, IBM Q, https://www.ibm.com/quantum-computing/
(last visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Computing, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/enus/quantum/ (last visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Computing, INTEL,
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/research/quantum-computing.html (last visited Dec 16,
2019); Quantum Computing: Spot-Checking Millions of Lines of Code, LOCKHEED MARTIN,
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2017/quantum-computing-spot-checkingmillions-lines-code.html (last visited Dec 16, 2019).
35
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Fujitsu, and D-Wave are also developing their own QC technology. 40 The U.S.,41
China, Russia, and the European Union are all investing billions of dollars into
developing quantum technology.42 In July 2019, Google announced a milestone in
quantum computing, in a proof of concept called “quantum supremacy.” 43
Quantum supremacy is the point at which a quantum computer can perform a
calculation that would be impossible for a classical computer.44 Google claims that
their “Sycamore processor takes about 200 seconds to sample one instance of a
quantum circuit a million times—our benchmarks currently indicate that the
equivalent task for a state-of-the-art classical supercomputer would take
approximately 10,000 years.” 45 While practical QC is likely years away, the
potential for disruption is undeniable.
Quantum computing can be both a sword and a shield. Like a sword, QC
could solve the complex algorithms that encrypt billions of daily banking and
online transactions.46 “In theory, quantum computers could ace complex problems
that stymie even the strongest supercomputers, such as factoring numbers that are
hundreds of digits long—an ability that could crack encryption. . . .”47 The National
Security Agency grew concerned enough that it has partnered with the National

40

Quantum Computing, BAIDU RESEARCH, http://research.baidu.com/Research_Areas/indexview?id=75 (last visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Computer, HITACHI,
https://www.hitachi.com/rd/portal/glossary/q/quantum_computer.html (last visited Dec 16, 2019);
Digital Annealer, FUJITSU, https://www.fujitsu.com/global/digitalannealer/ (last visited Dec 16,
2019); Practical Quantum Computing, DWAVE, https://www.dwavesys.com (last visited Dec 16,
2019).
41
OSTP Leads Implementation of the National Quantum Initiative Act, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.energy.gov/articles/ostp-leads-implementation-national-quantuminitiative-act.
42
Michael J. Biercuk & Richard Fontaine, The Leap Into Quantum Technology: A Primer For
National Security Professionals, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-technology-primer-national-securityprofessionals/.
43
Frank Arute et al., Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting Processor,
574 NATURE 505, 505 (2019) (https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1666-5).
44
Id.
45
Id.; but see Jordan Novet, IBM and Google disagree on quantum computing achievement,
CNBC (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/google-quantum-computingsupremacy-claim-disputed-by-ibm.html (explaining IBM’s disagreement with Google’s assertion
and disagreeing with the 10,000-year calculation).
46
Choi, supra note 36, at 24.
47
Id. at 26.
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Institute of Standards and Technology to evaluate new post-quantum era encryption
algorithms.48
As a shield, QC can make theoretically unbreakable encryption. 49 “The
most prevalent approach is known as quantum key distribution (QKD), through
which cryptographic keys are exchanged in quantum states through entanglement.
In accordance with the ‘no cloning’ theorem, quantum information cannot be
copied, and any attempted interference or eavesdropping within a quantum system
can be readily detected.”50 Quantum cryptography offers the promise that if a third
party intercepts a communication, the very act of intercepting the communication
alters the quantum state of the communication link, thus alerting operators that the
communication is not secure.51
The national security implications of performing at the speed of computer
processing, defeating all existing encryption, and unbreakably secure
communications are profound. Thankfully, the United States has laws and
regulations to mitigate the spread of valuable yet risky technology—arms control.
III. CYBER ARMS CONTROL
The United States employs a two-tier arms control framework to control the
export of sensitive technology. The Department of State controls weapons exports
through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).52 The Department of Commerce
controls the export of dual-use technology through the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR).53 Neither the AECA nor the EAR has been updated to address
the threat of exporting U.S. innovation in areas like AI or QC. The President, acting
through the Departments of State and Commerce, has the statutory and regulatory
authority to designate defense articles, defense services, or dual-use items that have

NSA Cybersecurity Perspectives on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography’,
NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, (Oct. 26, 2020) https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/FeatureStories/Article-View/Article/2394053/nsa-cybersecurity-perspectives-on-quantum-keydistribution-and-quantum-cryptogr)/.
49
Elsa B. Kania & John K. Costello, Quantum Hegemony? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge
to U.S. Innovation Leadership, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. 1, 3 (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-QuantumTech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
22 U.S.C.A. § 2751 (West 2014).
53
15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2019).
48
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both civilian and military applications. 54 Export control licensing requirements
should apply to both AI and QC.
A.

ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 authorizes the President to “control
the import and the export of defense articles and defense services and to provide
foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export and
import of such articles and services.”55 Any item that the President designates under
the AECA “shall constitute the United States Munitions List.”56 The United States
Munitions List (USML) is the comprehensive list of what defense articles and
services are subject to AECA export controls. Exporting any item listed on the
USML, triggers the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which is the
U.S. regulatory regime to “ensur[e] commercial exports of defense articles and
defense services advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.”57
Both the USML and ITAR are managed by the Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls (DDTC) within the Department of State. Before exporting an item listed
on the USML, the individual or business must obtain an export license from the
DDTC.58 Exporting a listed item, without a license, is a criminal offense punishable
with a $1,000,000 fine per instance, or imprisonment for not more than 20 years,
or both.59 The Secretary of State may also assess civil penalties up to $500,000 for
each violation.60
The USML covers twenty-one categories of defense articles and services,
ranging from shotguns to nuclear weapons. The USML does not designate AI or
QC as defense articles or services.61 But, in 2014 ITAR was updated to include the
firmware and software running the items listed on the USML as falling under the
same licensing requirements as the listed item.62 In practice, this is only a partially
54

22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2014); 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2019).
22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2014).
56
Id. For more explanation on the process of designating an item under the United States
Munitions Lists (USML), see Kathryn Toomey, What Experts Need to Know About the U.S.
Munitions List (USML), INT’L TRADE BLOG (May 16, 2016),
https://www.shippingsolutions.com/blog/what-exporters-need-to-know-about-the-us-munitionslist-usml.
57.
Robert L. Hobart, DDTC: Evaluating U.S. Defense Exports in 2020, DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 26,
2020), https://www.state.gov/ddtc-elevating-u-s-defense-exports-in-2020/.
58
22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b)(1)(a)(ii)(III) (West 2014).
59
22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(c) (West 2014).
60
22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(e) (West 2014).
61
See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2020).
62
22 C.F.R. § 120.45 (2020) (adding to the ITAR).
55
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effective control. It does not place any practical limits on commercial companies
exporting AI and QC, so long as they are not related to a listed defense article.
Companies have an incentive to not incorporate their technology into defense
articles listed on the USML to avoid ITAR licensing requirements.
There is precedent to use the USML to limit the export of technology with
similar national security equities that AI and QC present today. For example, from
World War II until 1996, nearly all cryptography was listed on the USML and
required an export license under ITAR. 63 Though unlike cryptography from the
mid-20th century, AI and QC straddle military and commercial enterprises.64 The
EAR fills the regulatory gap for technology that is neither solely military nor solely
commercial.
B.

EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS

The Department of Commerce, through the BIS implements the EAR. 65
The EAR, like the ITAR, requires individuals or businesses to obtain a license
before exporting certain items listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL).66 The
restrictions of the EAR are:
intended to serve the national security, foreign
policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and other interests of the U.S, . . . [s]ome
controls are designed to restrict access to items
subject to the EAR by countries or persons that might
apply such items to uses inimical to U.S. interests.67
The EAR generally applies to dual-use items: “[a] ‘dual-use’ item is one that has
civil applications as well as terrorism and military or weapons of mass destruction
63

22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995) (including cryptography before changing in 1996); see Bernstein v.
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at *1 , *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
19, 2004); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at
*1 , *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004); Tamotsu Aoi, Historical Background of Export Control and
Development in Selected Countries and Regions, INT’L SEC. TRADE CONTROL DEP. 12 (2016),
https://www.cistec.or.jp/english/service/report/1605historical_background_export_control_develo
pment.pdf.
64
See generally Andrew P. Hunter et al., Artificial Intelligence and National Security: The
Importance of the AI Ecosystem, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, 2018, at 3; Kania &
Costello, supra note 49 at 3.
65
15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2020).
66
See 15 C.F.R. § 730.7 (2020).
67
15 C.F.R. § 730.6 (2020).
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(WMD)-related applications.” 68 The CCL, like the USML, is a list of items
requiring an export license under the EAR.69 The items on the CCL are dual-use.70
Unlike the USML, the CCL is expansive, spanning 751 pages—compared
to the USML’s paltry 107 pages. The CCL also incorporates detailed technical
specifications to define the scope of what is covered.71 Also, unlike the USML, the
CCL does contain some controls on computer technology that could encompass AI
and QC.72 The question is, are the USML and CCL sufficient to maintain the U.S.
advantage in emerging technologies like AI and QC?
1.

EXPORT CONTROLS ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

There are some export controls on AI, but they are inadequate for the next
generation of AIs. The CCL requires a license to export a type of computer on
which current AIs operate called “neural computers.” 73 Neural computers are
“computational devices designed or modified to mimic the behavior of a neuron or
a collection of neurons, i.e., computational devices which are distinguished by their
hardware capability to modulate the weights and numbers of the interconnections
of a multiplicity of computational components based on previous data.” 74 In
simpler terms, neural computers mimic the way a human brain processes
information. The export restriction on neural computers only controls the current
generation of AI, like machine learning algorithms used for tasks like image
recognition.75 The BIS should expand the scope of the CCL to include AI with
greater function, and greater risk.
According to a paper recently published by AI researcher and Google
software engineer François Chollet, there are three levels of AI.76 The lowest level
is capable of accomplishing task-specific skills like differentiating between a dog

68

15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2020).
See 15 C.F.R. § 774.1 (2019).
70
See Commerce Control List, LEGAL INFO. INST. (2020),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_control_list.
71
See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020).
72
Id.
73
15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020).
74
Id.
75
See generally Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile
a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/chinasurveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html (discussing algorithms for image
recognition of members of a Muslim minority group in China).
76
See François Chollet, On the Measure of Intelligence, ARXIV.ORG (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://arxiv.org/ abs/1911.01547.
69
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and a cat in an image after being trained on may examples.77 These are AIs with
“local generalization.”78 “This is the form of generalization that machine learning
has been concerned with from the 1950s up to this day.”79 The second level is AI
that can be applied to varied, yet related, tasks without having to be retrained.80
These are AIs with “broad generalization.” “For instance, a L5 self-driving vehicle,
or a domestic robot capable of passing Wozniak’s coffee cup test (entering a
random kitchen and making a cup of coffee) could be said to display broad
generalization.”81 To date, no AI has achieved broad generalization.82 The highest
level of AI is one with human-like general intelligence, called “extreme
generalization.”83
The CCL-specific restriction on “neural computers” does little to maintain
our national security advantage, because low-level AI is already widely available.84
The current CCL only requires a license for AI running on a neural computer.85 The
CCL should be capability driven, not hardware-architecture driven. The CCL
should be amended to include AI with broad or extreme generalization as the
benchmark to trigger an EAR license requirement. A capability-based definition is
harder for developers to get around and captures what the U.S. should be concerned
about—losing a comparative advantage for the next generation of AI.
The Department of Commerce should define what AIs are within the scope
of the CCL by reference to an AI intelligence test. François Chollet helpfully
published a formula to measure how intelligent an AI is.86 His formula measures
77

Id. at 11; see also Shane & Wakabayashi, supra note 7 (illustrating an example of low-level,
task-specific A.I. in Google’s Project Maven).
78
Chollet, supra note 76.
79
Chollet, supra note 76; see generally Douglas Heaven, Why Deep-Leaning AIs Are So Easy to
Fool, NATURE, (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03013-5 (providing an
in-depth discussion of local generalization AI).
80
Chollet, supra note 76.
81
Chollet, supra note 76; see generally Steve Wozniak, Steve Wozniak aka “The Woz,” WOZ.ORG
(2019), http://www.woz.org/about/ (describing Steve Wozniak, who co-founded Apple with Steve
Jobs).
82
Chollet, supra note 76, at 11.
83
Id.; see generally Editorial, Human-Level AI Is Right Around the Corner—Or Hundreds of
Years
Away, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 31, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/humanlevel
-ai-is-right-around-the-corner-or-hundreds-of-years-away (presenting the predictions of
nine technologists as to when “brainlike” AI computing would become a reality, with responses
ranging from one decade to four hundred years).
84
See generally Mozur, supra note 75; Roszel C. Thomsen II, Artificial Intelligence and Export
Controls: Conceivable, But Counterproductive? 22 J. OF INTERNET L., 17 (2018).
85
15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020);
86
Chollet, supra note 76, at 39.
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an AI’s ability to sufficiently accomplish a task using the lowest number of training
inputs. 87 This formula is a reasonable starting point for the Department of
Commerce to amend the CCL and bring truly advanced AIs within the regulatory
scope of the EAR. Using the formula would accomplish the goal of defending our
national advantage in AI technology, and thus promoting our national security.
2.

EXPORT CONTROLS ON QUANTUM COMPUTERS

The CCL should also be amended to control the export of QC technology.
The CCL has existing restrictions on exporting computers, but not QCs
specifically. 88 In 2006, the CCL redefined the scope of which computers are
regulated by implementing a standardized formula called Adjusted Peak
Performance (APP). 89 Adjusted Peak Performance calculates a computer’s
processing power in a unit called Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT)90 and is intended to
also be able to identify high-performance computers (HPC) that can be “used for
national security applications [to] include vector supercomputers, massivelyparallel processor systems, and proprietary cluster architectures.” 91 The CCL
restricts the export of HPC that can compute between 16-29 WT.92 For reference,
the new $50,000 Apple Mac Pro with a 28 core Intel Xeon W processor has a WT
of 2.4. 93 The fastest supercomputer in the world can perform 200,000 trillion
calculations per second, or 200 petaflops.94 That is equivalent to an APP score of
between 60,000 and 180,000 WT (depending on how the technical specifications
of the supercomputer are accounted for in the APP formula).95

87

See id. at 39-40.
See 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020) (mentioning no quantum computing).
89
U.S. Dep’t of Com., Bureau of Industry and Security, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADJUSTED
PEAK PERFORMANCE, at 4 (2006), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/productguidance/865-practioner-s-guide-to-adjusted-peak-performance/file.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 6 (2020); 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020).
93
Chance Miller, Apple’s New Mac Pro Maxes Out at Over $50,000, and Higher Specs are
Coming, 9 TO 5 MAC, (Dec. 10, 2019), https://9to5mac.com/2019/12/10/mac-pro-max-price/;
see Export Compliance Metrics for Intel® Microprocessors: Intel® Xeon® Processors, INTEL
(2020), https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/processors/APP-for-IntelXeon-Processors.pdf.
94
ORNL Launches Summit Supercomputer, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB’Y (June 8, 2018),
https://www.ornl.gov/news/ornl-launches-summit-supercomputer.
95
Indiana University, Understand Measures of Supercomputer Performance and Storage System
Capacity, KNOWLEDGE BASE (2020), https://kb.iu.edu/d/apeq; A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO
ADJUSTED PEAK PERFORMANCE, supra note 89, at 6-7 (illustrating that the APP applies a
weighting factor of .3 or .9 depending on the type of processer used. 200 petaflops equal 200,000
teraflops, so 200,000 x .3 = 60,000, and 200,000 x .9 = 180,000).
88
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The fastest supercomputer in the world is subject to the EAR because the
APP can calculate its WT.96 Meanwhile, Google’s QC which reportedly calculated
in 200 seconds what would have taken that very same supercomputer 10,000 years
to calculate is likely not subject to any expert control based on the APP. 97 That is
because the APP measures the processing capacity in a way that only applies to
classical, not quantum.98 A quantum computer does not use bits or a traditional
processor, it solves problems using particles called quibits. 99 The technical
specifications of QC do not match the inputs for the APP formula.100 Therefore, the
APP cannot calculate a QC WT.101 The CCL only regulates HPC with a WT over
a certain threshold, so without a WT, QCs escape regulation.
Quantum computing has the potential to revolutionize areas like drug
discovery, but it also has the potential to make current cryptography obsolete.102
This is a classic example of the dual-use technology that the EAR regulates.103
However, QC is not regulated by the EAR because the Department of Commerce
has defined regulated HPC in a way that requires the APP formula to work. For
QC, this is a loophole.
Quantum computing is still in its infancy and no standard benchmark of QC
performance has emerged on which to base an updated CCL formula. That alone
may be cause to restrict the export of all QC technology until the technology has
matured. To maintain the U.S. advantage in HPC, the government should bring QC
within the scope of the EAR by adding a second benchmark or formula to the CCL
to account for the unique characteristics of QC. For example, the number of qubits
a QC uses or a capability-based definition that uses existing HPC capabilities at a
certain WT benchmark to make an equivalency determination.
96

See ORNL Launches Summit Supercomputer, supra note 94.
Arute, supra note 43, at 505.
98
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADJUSTED PEAK PERFORMANCE, supra note 89, at 4, 6.
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Choi, supra note 36, at 25.
100
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADJUSTED PEAK PERFORMANCE, supra note 89, at 6 (showing the
variables in the APP formula as follows: n number of processors in the “digital
computer,” i processor number, ti processor cycle time, Fi processor frequency, Ri peak floating
point calculating rate, and Wi architecture adjustment factor).
101
Id. (“For processors not capable of performing calculations on floating-point operands of 64bits or more the effective calculating rate R is zero.”).
102
See generally, Rick Mullin, Let’s Talk About Quantum Computing in Drug Discovery,
CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://cen.acs.org/business/informatics/Lets-talk-quantum-computing-drug/98/i35; Kania &
Costello, supra note 49 at 3-4.
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DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., supra note 17 (“The Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) controls the export of dual-use and less sensitive military items through the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).”).
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Export controls provide a shield for the U.S. to prevent the erosion of the
U.S. technological advantage. But, what if a U.S. company refuses to contract with
the government for critical advanced technology needed for military or national
security purposes? The Fifth Amendment offers a solution—a sword.
IV. TAKINGS CLAUSE 2.0
A private company will inevitably develop the next generation of
technology that is vital to our national defense. It is also foreseeable that a company
who possesses that technology may be unwilling to contract with the U.S.
government. 104 The government then must choose between either ceding a
comparative technological advantage, or compelling the company’s cooperation to
aid in our national defense. However, without congressional approval, the President
cannot use the power written into the Constitution to solve this problem.105
A.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The U.S. Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights, devolves to the
individual certain inalienable rights. Among them, private property is protected
against government seizure by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees individual due process: “nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”106 The
Fifth Amendment protects individual property rights: “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”107 This clause is referred to as the
“Takings Clause.”
While the Takings Clause seemingly protects property rights, it is also the
source of the government’s constitutional authority to take private property from
the individual for public benefit. 108 “The power of eminent domain . . . is an
essential attribute of sovereignty and has long been recognized as a power of the
104

See, e.g., Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Business of War: Google Employees
Protest Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html.
105
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585, 87.
106
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl 3.
107
U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 8.
108
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 311
(2007) (“An overarching principle endlessly quoted in the cases should be highlighted at the
outset. The Takings Clause, says the Supreme Court, ‘was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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Federal Government.” 109 The government uses the legal concept of eminent
domain to exercise this power: “[t]akings law flows from eminent domain: the
inherent power of the sovereign to take private property, as principally constrained
by the ‘public use’ and ‘just compensation’ prerequisites of the Takings Clause.”110
1.

PUBLIC USE

The first constitutional requirement is that a taking be “for public use.”111
The Supreme Court has held that a taking is for the “public use” when that taking
serves a “public purpose.”112 Public purposes that may justify the taking of private
property include “alleviating blight, reducing the concentration of land ownership,
and promoting economic development[.]” 113 National security as a “public
purpose” rationale has not been explicitly ruled on by the court. However, national
security (defense production) was the underlying rationale for the government’s
attempted seizure of steel mills in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., v. Sawyer.114 The
Supreme Court did not decide if national security was a “public use” in
Youngstown, and instead decided the case on another issue and ruled against the
government because the President acted without legislative authority.115
Courts have largely deferred to the legislature in deciding what constitutes
a “public purpose.”116 In its most cited eminent domain case, the Supreme Court
stated, “[f]or more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.”117 Simply put, “‘[i]t is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics’ . .
. that matters in determining public use.”118

109

Youngstown Tube & Sheet Co., v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 680 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting).
Meltz, supra note 108, at 310 (footnote omitted).
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U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 8.
112
Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
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Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 101 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 588-89.
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Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (“Judicial deference is required
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Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
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2.

JUST COMPENSATION

The second constitutional requirement is that the government pay “just
compensation.”119 Just compensation is equivalent to the fair market value of what
was taken.120 This paper does not address what compensation would be fair for the
most advanced technology ever created. If the situation becomes so dire that the
government must resort to a coercive power, like the Takings Clause, the pressing
question will not be money—it will be the authority to act.
3.

SEIZING TECHNOLOGY

The Takings Clause is not limited to real property. The government can use
eminent domain to take private land to build something like a road or a border
wall.121 The Takings Clause can also be used to seize “tangible and intangible”
personal property including: “franchises, money, debts of a lender, liens, most
contract rights, patents and copyrights, trade secrets, unpatented mining claims, and
causes of action once reduced to final, unreviewable judgment.”122
However, this author has yet to find an instance where the government has
seized technology or its underlying intellectual property using eminent domain.
While there is no historical example of seizing intellectual property, based on the
government’s previous seizure of intangible property, the intellectual property
underpinning AI and QC is likely subject to seizure if Congress passes specific
authority for the executive to act. While seizing intellectual property would be
novel, so was every use of eminent domain to seize a new form of property for the
public good.
Over the last century, eminent domain was used for the public’s benefit to
construct highways, build flood control, and increase electrification of the U.S..123
The intellectual property underpinning our modern world is as inseparable from the
public welfare as those public works projects of the past: “[t]oday's public interests
119

U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 8.
U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
121
See Katie Zezima and Mark Berman, Trump’s wall needs private property. But some Texans
won’t give up their land without a fight, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2019),
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Meltz, supra note 108 at 319-20.
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Meet, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 41, 42 (2002).
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will require that the public be able to acquire the intellectual property it needs, even
if its owners are unwilling to part with it.”124 Again, when determining whether a
taking is in the public interest, “‘it is only the taking's purpose, and not its
mechanics,’ . . . that matters.”125
Congress has the power to define “public use.”126 If Congress determines
that the seizure of privately owned advanced technology is in the interest of the
country’s national security—a public purpose—courts are unlikely to overrule
Congress’s judgment.127 The Supreme Court has broadly defined what “serves a
‘public purpose’ . . . [by] reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to
legislative judgments in this field.”128 In 1952, President Truman attempted to use
his inherent executive authority to seize private property for a national security
purpose, but the Supreme Court rebuked him.129 The Court held that the President
must act with some congressional authority, expressed or implied, to seize property
under the Constitution. 130 “The President's power . . . must stem either from an act
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”131
B.

NEW STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The long-held legal axiom, drawn from Youngstown, that the president
cannot use eminent domain to solve a national security issue is misplaced. The core
presumption in Youngstown is that if Congress grants the president the authority to
use eminent domain, the courts will not stand in the way.132 Congress should heed
history’s warning and authorize the President to use the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as a backstop to corporate intransigence. The Declaration of Taking
Act (DTA) grants the President both the standing authority and a procedural
mechanism to seize real property.133 Congress should enact analogous legislation
to the DTA, but for emerging technology.
124
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In a recent article, Professor Pollack makes the case for such a statute, the
Data Taking Act, modeled after the DTA.134 While the likelihood is small that the
government would be able to convince a private company to sell their technology
in aid of our national defense, the risk is significant enough that we should establish
contingent authority. Congress should grant the President eminent domain
authority, and a mechanism to exercise such authority, modeled on the DTA to
seize vital technology in the national interest. Even if never used, having the
authority to unilaterally act would be a powerful incentive for private companies to
contract with government, or risk having their technology taken.
V. NOT ALL ROSES
Arms control regulations and eminent domain legislation can and should be
part of the U.S. national strategy to maintain our strategic technological advantage.
However, neither of these options should be our first choice. We should continue
to do what has kept America great: outcompeting the competition. Arms control
and eminent domain are only appropriate when outcompeting is not enough. Arms
control is a stop-gap measure to stem the flow of technology transfer. Eminent
domain forces private enterprise to align with U.S. national security interests. Both
are blunt-force options, but not long-term solutions.135
A.

EXPORT CONTROL

Of the two options discussed in this paper, export control regulations are
the most likely to succeed. They can be tailored and targeted to a specific
technology.136 They describe what technology is subject to a give restriction using
detailed technical language and specify to which countries a specific technology
can and cannot be exported.137 Arms and commerce control regulations are also not
all that controversial. They have been used for decades.138

Pollack, supra note 113, at 102 (Professor Pollack’s premise is that the government’s Fifth
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Nevertheless, export control regulations still carry risk. The main risk being
that companies will develop technology outside of the United States to avoid export
controls altogether. The United States’ goal should be to promote the domestic
development of technology to maintain our global technological advantage. If the
U.S. erects a closed development system through regulation, that would
disincentivize companies from creating the next generation of technology in the
US.
The U.S. can overcome this catch-22 by using a tiered approach. Only the
most significant and advanced technology would be subject to strict export controls.
Technology like QC that is barely more than theoretical can have stringent controls
will little consequence. Artificial intelligence export controls would require a tiered
approach. The more advanced the AI the more restrictions are imposed on its
export. U.S. national security would not benefit from regulating AI that is already
commercially available. But, for AI that is capable of “broad” or “extreme
generalization,” the author opines that the advantage gained by stringent export
controls far outweighs the risk of companies avoiding technology development in
the US.139
B.

EMINENT DOMAIN

It is undeniable that eminent domain offers the government a solution to the
problem identified by this paper. If a company possesses advanced technology but
restricts government access to it, and that in turn harms the U.S. technological
advantage, the government can simply use eminent domain to seize that technology.
It is also undeniable that using eminent domain in such a manner would be opening
a Pandora’s box.
If Congress passed a Data Taking Act, and then that legislature was utilized
to actually seize technology, intellectual property would flee the country and be
offshored to escape the reach of the U.S.’s long-arm. Thus, defeating the goal of
the U.S. government’s access to U.S. developed technology. If the U.S. government
determines that a piece of technology is so vital to the national interest and that the
only way to gain access to it is through eminent domain, it should act knowing that
eminent domain is a one-shot weapon.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States is the global leader in AT and QC technology, but our
global competitors are not far behind.140 Maintaining our advantage in emerging
technologies, like AI and QC, is vital to the U.S. national security interest.
However, unlike the past, private companies—not the government—are the
driving force of innovation.141 The government has lost direct control of the
distribution and use of the technology that is vital to its future.142 But, we have the
legal tools to confront both problems.
First, the President, through the Departments of State and Commerce,
should update existing export control regulations to bring AI and QC within their
purview.143 These regulations need to catch up with emerging technology.
Second, Congress should grant the President the authority to seize vital
technology using the federal government’s eminent domain power under the Fifth
Amendment’s Taking Clause.144 Such an authority will prevent a U.S. company’s
self-interest from overriding the country’s national interest. The United States can
benefit from private sector innovation while maintaining our global advantage.
We can have our cake and eat it too.
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Appendix A.

Artificial Intelligence Export Control Classification Number

4D004 “Artificial Intelligence”
License Requirements
Reason for Control: NS, CC, AT
Control(s)
NS applies to entire entry
RS applies to entire entry
AT applies to entire entry

Country Chart (See Supp. No. 1 to part 738)
NS Column 1
RS Column 2
AT Column 1

Reporting Requirements
See § 743.1 of the EAR for reporting requirements for exports under License Exceptions, and
Validated End–User authorizations.
List Based License Exceptions (See Part 740 for a Description of All License Exceptions)
List of Items Controlled
Related Controls: N/A
Related Definitions: N/A
Items:
a. “Artificial Intelligence” shall include “software”, that that is capable of the following:
a.1. “Broad generalization”, adaptation to unknown unknowns across a broad category of
related tasks; or
a.2. “Human-level generalization”, adaptation to unknown unknowns across an unknown
range of tasks and domains at or near the level of biological forms of intelligence.
b. “Artificial Intelligence” shall include any component, hardware, firmware, or other unique
technical capability, working individually or collectively, that allows “software” to achieve
“broad generalization” or “human-level generalization”.

A-1

Appendix B.

Quantum Computer Export Control Classification Number

4D999 Computers as follows (see List of Items Controlled) and “specially designed” related
equipment, “electronic assemblies” and “components” therefore.
License Requirements
Reason for Control: NS, CC, AT
Control(s)
NS applies to entire entry
RS applies to entire entry
AT applies to entire entry

Country Chart (See Supp. No. 1 to part 738)
NS Column 1
RS Column 2
AT Column 1

Reporting Requirements
See § 743.1 of the EAR for reporting requirements for exports under License Exceptions, and
Validated End–User authorizations.
List Based License Exceptions (See Part 740 for a Description of All License Exceptions)
List of Items Controlled
Related Controls: 4A003, 4A004
Related Definitions: “digital computer”, “Adjusted Peak Performance”
Items:
a. “Quantum Computers”; or
b. Any computing device having the ability to solve a computation problem that a “digital
computers” having an “Adjusted Peak Performance” (“APP”) exceeding 1,000 Weighted
TeraFLOPS (WT) is capable of solving in less than 1 hour.
Technical Notes:
1. “Quantum Computers” are any computers that calculate using particles suspended in
superposition or rely upon the principle or entanglement.
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Appendix C.

Taking Authority for Critical Technology Act (TACT Act)

(a) Filing and Content.—In any proceeding in any court of the United States outside of the
District of Columbia brought by and in the name of the United States and under the authority
of the Federal Government to acquire technology, or its sub-components, or underlying
intellectual property for the public use, the petitioner may file, with the petition or at any time
before judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire
the land described in the petition, declaring that the technology, sub-component(s), or
intellectual property is taken for the use of the Government. The declaration of taking shall
contain or have annexed to it—
(1) a statement of the authority under which, and the public use for which, the
technology, its sub-components, or underlying intellectual property is taken;
(2) a description sufficient to identify what has been taken;
(3) a statement of the extent of what has been taken for public use;
(4) a list of the tangible or intangible property taken, including a specific identification
of any patented intellectual property taken;
(5) a statement of the amount of money estimated by the acquiring authority to be just
compensation for property taken; and
(6) a description of the Government’s prior attempt seeking to purchase, lease, or
otherwise gain amenable mutual access to the property at issue.
(b) Vesting of Ownership.—On filing the declaration of taking and depositing in the court, to
the use of the persons entitled to the compensation, the amount of the estimated compensation
stated in the declaration—
(1) Ownership or interest specified in the declaration vests in the Government; and
(2) the right to just compensation for the property taken vests in the persons entitled to
the compensation.
(c) Compensation.—
(1) Determination and award.—
Compensation shall be determined and awarded in the proceeding and established by
judgment. The judgment shall include interest, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1961, on
the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking and
shall be awarded from that date to the date of payment. Interest shall not be allowed on
as much of the compensation as has been paid into the court. Amounts paid into the
court shall not be charged with commissions or poundage.
(2) Order to pay.—
On application of the parties in interest, the court may order that any part of the money
deposited in the court be paid immediately for or on account of the compensation to be
awarded in the proceeding.
(3) Deficiency judgment.—
If the compensation finally awarded is more than the amount of money received by any
person entitled to compensation, the court shall enter judgment against the Government
for the amount of the deficiency.
(d) Authority of Court.—On the filing of a declaration of taking, the court—
(1) may fix the time within which, and the terms on which, the parties in possession
shall be required to surrender possession to the petitioner; and
(2) may make just and equitable orders to make respondent financially whole.
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(e) Vesting Not Prevented or Delayed.—
An appeal or undertaking given in a proceeding does not prevent or delay the vesting of
ownership in the Government.
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